When Control Markets Are Treated: Potential Competition and Merger Retrospectives Draft
Abstract
Merger retrospectives treat peripheral markets where neither merging firm operates as untreated controls. We show this assumption is testable and often fails in network industries: mergers can either increase or decrease the entry threat incumbents face, and incumbents reprice before entry occurs. We construct a continuous, signed measure of merger-induced entry threat and a debiased machine-learning estimator for continuous, generated treatments in difference-in-differences designs. Across four U.S. airline mergers, a ten-percentage-point increase in entry threat lowers average peripheral fares by 2.4 to 4.2 percent. Applying this sensitivity analysis to the American-US Airways merger reverses the sign of the overlap-route effect.
Keywords: Airline Industry, Peripheral Markets, Merger Analysis, Doubly Debiased Machine Learning